UPDATE ON REJECTED TAKEOFF SAFETY STATISTICS (Continued)

When the task force concluded its study, Boeing led an industrywide effort to develop the Takeoff Safety Training Aid (TOSTA). The TOSTA was released in 1992 with the endorsement of the FAA. The TOSTA specifically addressed the task force’s first two recommendations and indirectly caused an improvement to the third. Along with the TOSTA, FAA Advisory Circular 120-62 provides direction and guidelines for airlines to implement the lessons learned (as presented in the TOSTA) in their own training programs. Many airlines around the world did incorporate these lessons into their training programs, and the results show that we—the aviation industry—made a positive difference. The number of RTO overrun accidents and incidents that occurred in the 1990s was 22. This compares to 28 RTO overrun accidents and incidents during the 1980s, despite a nearly 50 percent increase in the number of takeoffs in the 1990s.

All of us in the industry should be proud of this important achievement in aviation safety. It resulted from the regulators, airlines, pilots, and manufacturers working together to define the root causes of RTO events, and from airlines and other training agencies incorporating important lessons learned into their training programs.

Appendix 4B of the TOSTA contains a list of the 74 RTO overrun accidents and incidents studied during development of the training aid. The additional 20 events reported since the TOSTA study are shown in table 1. The total 94 events are all the RTO runway overrun accidents and incidents for the Western-built jet fleet associated with the length of the runway available for takeoff. The incidents are events that could have been accidents had the overrun area been more hostile.

Figure 3 in sections 2 and 4 of the TOSTA shows the occurrence of RTO overrun accidents and incidents by year. Figure 1 in this article shows RTO statistics updated through the end of the 20th century. Despite the relatively high number of RTO overrun events that occurred in both 1996 and 1997, the rate of RTO overruns in the 1990s was significantly less than in the previous decade.

Figure 5 in sections 2 and 4 of the TOSTA shows a chart describing seven categories of reasons for initiating an RTO in the 74 cases listed in appendix B. Figure 2 in this article incorporates the additional 20 RTO events that occurred from April 1990 through December 1999. It shows that the percentage of RTO accidents and incidents precipitated by perceived or real engine failures dropped slightly to 21 percent from 24 percent. The figure also shows an increase in the percentage of RTO events related to tire failures (real or perceived), lack of flight crew coordination, and indicator/light problems.

Figure 4 in sections 2 and 4 of the TOSTA shows a distribution of speeds at which the overrun RTOs were initiated and a breakout of the reported runway condition for the 74 cases in the study. Figure 3 in this article shows the breakout of RTO initiation speed for the total 94 RTO accidents and incidents reported through the end of the 20th century. The number of overrun events that began after V1 remains at more than 50 percent. Figure 4 in this article shows the updated percentages for the runway condition. These numbers remain fairly constant, with 39 percent of RTO events occurring on dry runways and 32 percent of them occurring on wet or contaminated runways.

Unfortunately, RTO overrun accidents and incidents continue to occur. However, the rate of occurrence continues to drop. Table 2 shows the number of departures and RTO accidents and incidents by decade. Figure 5 in this article shows the rate of RTO overrun accidents and incidents expressed as events per 10 million takeoffs. Compared to the 1960s, the 1990s showed a 78 percent decrease in the rate of RTO overrun accidents and incidents.

The industry can attribute this major improvement in RTO safety to many factors, but especially to better airplane systems, better and more reliable engines and, in the 1990s, better training and standards, such as the Evergreen International Airlines example in the accompanying article. At Boeing, we will continue to improve our airplanes and work with our engine, tire, and brake suppliers to improve their products. We urge all airlines to continue their good efforts related to effective training in the areas of takeoff decisionmaking and RTO procedure execution.

List of charts:

• Table 1. RTO Overrun Accidents/Incidents Since RTO Takeoff Safety Training Aid Study
• Table 2. Accidents/Incidents Per 10 Million Takeoffs
• Figure 1. 94 RTO Overrun Accidents/Incidents Since 1959
• Figure 2. Reasons For Initiating RTO (94 Accidents/Incidents)
• Figure 3. RTO Initiation Speed
• Figure 4. Runway Condition
• Figure 5. Rate Of RTO Overrun Accidents/Incidents

DICK ELLIOTT
MANAGER, AIRLINE SUPPORT
FLIGHT OPERATIONS ENGINEERING
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES GROUP

BILL ROBERSON
CHIEF PILOT, TRAINING, TECHNICAL & STANDARDS
FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES GROUP

MIKE SHIRKEY
SENIOR PRINCIPAL ENGINEER
FLIGHT OPERATIONS ENGINEERING
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES GROUP