PROPOSAL 6
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
ON ANNUAL ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
A shareholder has advised the Company that it intends to present the following
resolution at the Annual Meeting. In accordance with applicable proxy
regulations, the proposed resolution and supporting statement, for which
the Board of Directors and the Company accept no responsibility, are set
forth below. Approval of this proposal would require the affirmative vote
of a majority of the outstanding shares of Boeing stock present in person
or by proxy and entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting.
Shareholder Resolution
RESOLVED: Annual Election of All Directors. In each of the
Boeing 1997, 1999 and 2000 elections shareholder approval for this topic
ranged from 47% to 49.9%. Shareholders request the Board of Directors
take all necessary steps to adopt annual election of all directors as
corporate policy.
This includes the requirement that a shareholder vote, voting on
a separate topic, is required to change this resolution once enacted.
The unexpired terms of current directors are not affected.
Proponent's Supporting Statement
Shareholders recommend that the company enact this proposal now.
The Council of Institutional Investors (http://www.cii.org) recommends
in its Shareholder Bill of Rights:
(1) Annual election of all directors.
(2) Adoption of shareholder resolutions that receive a majority of
votes cast. Boeing is 48%-owned by institutional investors.
Good governance rules can improve stock price:
A new survey by McKinsey & Co., international management consultant,
shows that institutional investors are prepared to pay an 18% premium
for good corporate governance.
Wall Street Journal; June 19, 2000
We believe the company has not taken any significant step to improve
its corporate governance rules.
Based on the 3 years of strong support the company is asked to:
(1) Adopt this proposal or
(2) Submit this proposal to a vote of shareholders under company
sponsorship.
Vote yes for:
ANNUAL ELECTION OF ALL DIRECTORS
YES ON 6
Board of Directors' Response
The Board of Directors has evaluated the changes suggested by this
proposal on several occasions. This evaluation has included guidance
from outside advisers, including a consultant on corporate governance
issues. The Board believes that its classified Board structure, which
has been in place since it was approved by the shareholders in 1986,
continues to be in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders.
Under the Company's By-Laws, the Board is divided into three classes
with directors elected to staggered three-year terms. Approximately
one-third of the directors stand for election each year, and the entire
Board can be replaced in the course of three annual meetings, all held
within approximately two years. An active, professional board benefits
in many ways from classifying its directors. Most notable among these
benefits are increased stability, improved long-term planning and enhanced
independence.
The three-year staggered terms are designed to provide stability and
ensure that a majority of the Company's directors at any given time
have prior experience as directors of the Company. This ensures that
the Board has solid knowledge of the Company's complex business and
products, as well as its product strategy. Directors who have experience
with the Company and knowledge about its business are a valuable resource
and are better positioned to make the fundamental decisions that are
best for the Company and its shareholders. The Board observes that numerous
well-respected U.S. corporations and institutional investors have classified
boards.
The Board believes that electing directors to staggered three-year
terms enhances long-term strategic planning. We believe that the Board
continuity made possible by the classified Board structure is essential
to the proper oversight of a company like Boeing that has high-technology
products and programs that require major investments to be made over
long periods of time. A classified board is appropriate for Boeing and
ensures responsible, knowledgeable representation of the long-term interests
of Boeing and its shareholders. The annual election of only one-third
of the Board also helps to prevent abrupt changes in corporate policies,
based on misplaced short-term objectives that might result if the entire
Board could be replaced in one year.
We believe that electing directors to three-year, as opposed to one-year,
terms also enhances the independence of non-management directors by
providing them with a longer assured term of office. The existence of
three-year terms for directors also assists the Company in attracting
director candidates who are willing to make a longer-term commitment
to the Company.
The Board also believes that a classified Board structure enhances
the Board's ability to negotiate the best results for shareholders in
a takeover situation. One benefit of having a classified board is that
it encourages a person seeking to obtain control of the Company to negotiate
with the Board. At least two annual shareholders meetings generally
will be required to effect a change in control of the Board. This gives
the incumbent directors the time and leverage necessary to evaluate
the adequacy and fairness of any takeover proposal, negotiate on behalf
of all shareholders and weigh alternative methods of maximizing shareholder
value for all shareholders. It is important to note, however, that although
the classified Board is intended to cause a person seeking to obtain
control of the Company to negotiate with the Board, the existence of
a classified board will not, in fact, prevent a person from accomplishing
a hostile acquisition.
The Board believes that the benefits of the current classified board
structure do not come at the cost of directors' accountability to shareholders.
We believe that directors elected to three-year terms are just as accountable
to shareholders as directors elected annually, since all directors are
required to uphold their fiduciary duties to the Company and its shareholders,
regardless of the length of their term of office. The annual election
of one-third of the directors provides shareholders with an orderly
means to effect change and communicate their views on the performance
of the Company and its directors.
Approval of the proposal would not automatically eliminate the classified
board, as this proposal is only a recommendation. Eliminating the classified
board would require the affirmative vote of at least 75% of the outstanding
shares on a proposal to amend Article II, Section 1 of the Company's
By-Laws, which provides for a classified board.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMENDS A VOTE AGAINST
PROPOSAL 6.
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